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1. Introduction 
 
This report studies how citizens, private individuals of different backgrounds, construct their 
identities in regard to their view of themselves as nationals, Europeans and modern subjects. 
In accordance with our WP6 report, in which we interviewed various professional and 
collective actors to uncover the notions of Turkishness, Europeanness, Europe and modernity 
have been accommodated in the field of education, this report will focus on the following 
themes: a) Immigration, multiculturalism and citizenship; b) Liberalism and globalisation (i.e. 
essentially illustrated in the market driven/ competition driven reforms put forward by the 
Bologna Process); c) History education reforms as indicator of national identity construction 
debates; and d) the representation of religion and secularisation in education sector. 
 
In order to provide a broader perspective on the ways in which citizens perceive Turkishness, 
Europeanness, and place Turkey and Europe within the framework of 
modernity/modernization, we will draw upon our findings in the WP6 report and the 
interviews we conducted with students, professionals in the field of education, as adults with 
an invested interest such as parents, and adults without invested interest in the field of 
education such as retirees.  
 
Primarily, our findings support the notion of growing EUscepticism, rather than 
Euroscepticism, which we also underlined in the WP6 Report.  As we have discussed in the 
previous report, our interlocutors indicated that Europe and the EU are two different concepts 
in the habitats of meaning of the Turkish citizens. The interlocutors have implicitly, and 
sometimes explicitly, referred to the distinction between the two, favouring the former 
(Europe). Europeanization is perceived as a long standing transformation process on the 
societal level vis-a-vis the transformation of values while the Europeanization initiated by the 
EU or as Alper Kaliber (2002) notes “EUization”, refers to the technical and structural 
transformation of the political and legal systems vis-a-vis the implementation of the acquis. 
One could explain their reservation about the latter through the rising wave of  EUscepticisim 
since 2005, which marks the end of the virtuous cycle (1999 and 2005) and the beginning of 
the vicious cycle. This turn of events can be attributed to the nationalist revivals embraced by 
the large number of Turkish citizens, particularly by middle-class and upper middle-class 
groups. In the meantime, Öniş argues that Euroscepticism within the state elite is to be 
founded on the “Sevres Syndrome”, which is based on a fear deriving from the post-World 
War I era characterized with a popular belief regarding the risk of the break-up of the 
Ottoman-Turkish state by the colonial western powers (Öniş, 2004: 12). In this framework, 
we observe that Europeanization is often perceived as a long-term process while EUization is 
often associated with the reformation process in the post-Helsinki period. EUization is often 
unwelcome by the interlocutors as they question the sustainability and the motivations behind 
the EU.  
 
This report will provide an analysis of private persons‟ attitudes towards the field of education 
through an investigation of how they perceive the current education system in Turkey and 
comparatively the system in Europe. Subsequently drawing upon our findings we will provide 
an analysis of how individuals perceive Turkishness and Europeanness as well as their 
perceptions towards Europe and the EU.  
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2. Research Design 
 
In line with our findings in our WP6 report, we chose the following four topics as subject 
matters for our interviews: a) Education in one‟s mother language particularly education in 
Kurdish and the boycotts that occurred in September 2010; b) The Bologna Process, which 
aims for the Europeanization of higher education and criticisms regarding its neoliberal 
motivations; c) History education in Turkish high schools and the way in which neighbouring 
countries, for instance Greece and Armenia and European countries are portrayed in the text 
books; and d) The headscarf ban at Turkish Universities and the student protests. We wanted 
to choose topics that were well publicized by the media, thus referring to a wider interview 
base while we made sure that they would be considered as conflictual.  
 
The first issue (education in mother language, Kurdish in particular) has been a well-
publicized issue since 2008. While we did not ask any direct question about education in 
mother language in the WP6 report, it was referenced in our question regarding the 
accommodation of migrants, minorities and multiculturalism in education. It is also necessary 
to state that while we addressed this issue under multiculturalism, it became an even more 
important question in and of itself during our research. On 24 December 2010, Minister of 
Interior Beşir Atalay stated that the official language of the country is Turkish, while the state 
is in the process of accommodating the other languages spoken in Turkey, “the unitary state, 
and one flag, one language” ideal of the Turkish nation is not open to discussion (Cumhuriyet 
Daily, http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/, 24.12.2010). Therefore, considering the intensifying 
debates surrounding this issue, we chose education in one‟s mother language as a relevant 
subject matter. 
 
The second subject matter (Bologna Process) was identified as a reform/turning point in our 
WP5 report; in fact we identified it as the latest turning point thus placing emphasis on the 
Bologna process in the context of Turkey‟s Europeanization efforts. We were also able to 
observe that the number of research on this issue was limited and the available scholarly work 
focused on the structural reforms that the process necessitated such as the quality management 
systems and accreditation (Mızıkacı 2003 and 2005; Erçetin 2006). In light of our previous 
findings from WP5 and WP6 reports, we chose the Bologna Process, its neoliberal 
motivations and the skill-based aspect of the Process vis-a-vis market orientation as a valid 
subject matter.  
 
The third issue (history education) was identified as a problem via the WP6 expert interviews, 
and valuable data were collected on the history education and the type of citizen it anticipates 
to generate. In light of the critical views on the subject matter, we chose to integrate this 
subject into our study. More importantly, we anticipate that history education and the ways in 
which European countries are referenced is likely to provide critical information about the 
ways in which interlocutors perceive European countries. This question was particularly 
important in identifying whether individuals believe in the negative imageries of neighbouring 
countries and European countries, or whether they perceive these discourses  as a shortcoming 
of the system, thus approach these discourses critically.  
 
The fourth topic, which is the headscarf ban at higher education, has been a politically critical 
issue argued to be polarizing public opinion. Our WP6 interviews revealed that this issue is 
debated in reference to the laicist nature of the Turkish state and Constitution, and with 
reference to politicization. In line with these arguments, for this report we focused on the 
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headscarf ban and subsequent student protests.
1
 This issue was also chosen as an important 
issue to reference the religious revival in the past decade, which we will analyze in the 
framework of Turkish identity construction.  
 
In doing so, we conducted 20 in-depth interviews, in which we utilized snowball sampling. In 
selecting the interlocutors, we placed emphasis on diversifying ethnic, religious and 
educational backgrounds of the interlocutors to ensure diversification of opinions. On the 
other hand, the interlocutors who participated in the field-work were predominantly of 
middle-class background with high levels of educational background. This is in part 
attributable to the fact that the four themes we selected were about higher education in 
Turkey.   
 
Furthermore, the interviews lasted between 50 minutes to 1 hour 30 minutes. All interviews 
were recorded with the interlocutors‟ consent and the recordings were transcribed. 
Subsequently, these interviews were analyzed through Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
method (Wodak, 2010). 
 
Sample distribution by Gender 
 
Female 11 
Male 9  
 
Sample distribution by Age: 20-40 and 40-65 
 
20-40 age  13 
40-65 age  6 
65-70 age  1  
 
Sample distribution by marital status: 
 
Married 8  
Single 12 
 
Sample distribution by Religious beliefs 
 
Islam
 2
 9 
No response 7  
Christian 3 
Agnostic 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
It is important to note that our WP6 report provided information on the way in which headscarf ban was 
discussed in various levels of education while this report will exclusively focus on higher education.   
2
 In terms of religion and religious beliefs, majority of the interlocutors stated Islam, but a considerable number 
also emphasized that they are stating what is written in their national identification card.  
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Sample distribution by Ethnic background
3
 
 
Turkish 6 
German-Turk 1 
Caucasian 1 
Kurdish 1 
Turkish-
German  
1 
Alevi 2 
Assyrian 1 
No response 7 
 
Sample distribution by Socio-economical background 
 
Low 4 
Middle 12 
High 4 
  
Sample distribution by Educational Background 
 
Studying at undergraduate level 8 
Studying at graduate level 3 
Holds a BA degree 3 
Holds an MA degree 2 
Holds a PhD degree 4 
 
Furthermore, in order to harmonize our field study with our fellow partners, we have 
formulated our questions as follows: 
 
 Do you consider this issue an important? Is there a “real issue” that is behind this debate?   
 What is your own opinion about the matter? 
 Do you know if similar issues occur in other European countries as well? When you think 
about those issues, do you feel that there is something in common that citizens of Turkey 
and citizens of European countries share?  
 Is it possible to adopt a common solution with Europe? (See Annex A for detailed 
questionnaire) 
 
In reference to the interview questions, we should indicate that these questions were not 
referenced by the interviewers in the form of the “European Union”. Such that the last two 
questions, though relevant on these issues, were not welcome and evaded by the majority 
interlocutors. Furthermore, most interlocutors preferred to address European countries in 
reference to “foreign countries” and/or “foreign powers”. 
 
3. Analysis and Findings 
 
                                                          
3
 Some of the interlocutors who did not wish to respond to the question of ethnicity also indicated that they do 
not understand the relevance of this question. In that regard, particularly interviewees in their 20s were hesitant 
to provide an answer. This indicates that ethnic identities are not still explicitly outspoken by individuals due to 
the prevailing stereotypes and republican myth of homogeneity. For further discussion see Kaya (2011). ) 
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We will now analyse our findings starting with the education in mother language, and then 
following with the Bologna Process, history education in high schools, and eventually the 
headscarf ban at universities in Turkey.  
 
Education in mother language  
 
The interlocutors approached and discussed the issue of education in Kurdish in two distinct 
ways: as a human rights issue and as a politicized issue, which is believed to mask separatist 
motivations. In that regard, we observe that while both views are present, majority of the 
interlocutors are not supportive of education in Kurdish due to legal and/or practical reasons. 
Majority of the interlocutors indicated that while all individuals should in theory have the 
right to education in their mother language, they need to learn Turkish in order to be able to 
communicate with the majority of the society.  To that effect, AK noted that:  
 
“There cannot be various languages in education. Turkey is not a federal state; there is 
a given language, which is the language that we communicate in (WP7/3).”  
 
While there has been a general discomfort when we explored the possibility of a solution, VA 
also argued that:  
 
“It is hard to find a common solution on this issue with Europe; I think Europe is 
politicizing this issue. This should be approached in a practical way... I think it is 
being exaggerated (WP7/17).” 
 
VA‟s approach is a widespread one in the sense that quite a number of people in Turkey with 
a EUsceptic view believe that the EU is trying to divide Turkey through publicizing minority 
claims (Öniş, 2004; and Kaya, 2011).).  AB (WP7/10), on the other hand, noted that the main 
problem with this issue is the way in which it is carried out in reference to Turkish citizenship 
shaped by ethnicity rather than by human rights. While some interlocutors indicated that 
ethnic based definition of Turkish citizenship is problematic, majority seemed to agree with 
SÖ who noted that:  
 
“since they [Kurds] are citizens of Turkey, they should know the language of the 
majority to live in this geography. It is unnerving to even discuss this (WP7/14).”  
 
In that regard, once again we can infer that there is confusion in private persons‟ minds 
regarding the definition of Turkish citizenship and what it entails (Kirişçi 2000; Yeğen 2004; 
Kadıoğlu 2007; and Üstel 2004). 
 
In coherence with our findings from the WP6 expert interviews, MY (WP7/13), EI (WP7/15), 
CS (WP7/6) and PB (WP7/2) noted that they are not comfortable with the way in which 
education in mother language has been exclusively associated with the Kurdish community 
and language. PB, as a Greek origin Turkish citizen (Rum), indicated that she has learned 
both Turkish and Greek in school, and argued that:  
 
“I think people should study in their mother tongue, but they should also know the 
language of the country they live in. In terms of television broadcasts, now they have a 
television channel in Kurdish, then they should have channels in Armenian and Greek 
as well. You cannot just single out the Kurds (WP7/2).” 
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To that effect, MY further argued that all minority languages in Turkey should be approached 
with the same level of respect and stated that: 
 
“In Turkey, Kurdish is not the only language spoken by the families, there are also 
Arabic, Laz, Abkhazian languages. Why do we refer to the mother language issue with 
respect to Kurdish only? In order to prevent separatism and maintain the unity in 
Turkey, we should approach all these languages with the same respect. We can learn 
from the USA in this sense (WP7/13).” 
 
In line with this argument SÖ (WP7/14) and BK (WP7/16) argued that education in Kurdish 
should also be viewed as an enrichment of the Turkish culture. UA was the only interlocutor 
who addressed the heterogeneity of the Kurdish population and noted that  
 
“There are many different dialects, for example is Zaza a different dialect or a 
different language from the Kirmanchi dialect of the Kurdish language (WP7/9).” 
  
UA‟s intervention correspond to the fact that there is recently a growing consciousness among 
the Zaza speaking Kurds with Alevi background about their distinctiveness vis-a-vis the 
Kirmanchi peaking Kurds with Sunni background (Romano, 2006).  
 
When asked if they are aware of similar cases in Europe, the majority of the interlocutors 
indicated that that they are aware of the Catalans in Spain as a similar debate in Europe. 
However, those who refer to Catalans also stated that they have a concern that Kurds might 
also further their demands for education to a separate state. The armed conflicts between the 
PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) and the Turkish armed forces were also brought up in 
reference to this topic. Some interlocutors indicated that education in Kurdish might lead to 
separatist movements and strengthen the influence of the PKK. Nevertheless, CY argued that: 
 
“I know that there are some PKK members who are not Kurdish but French or 
Russian. I think this is supported by international sources. Separatist movements have 
always been around (WP7/7).” 
 
BB, on the other hand, maintained that his perception of right to education in Kurdish is 
associated with separatist efforts, and indicated that Kurdish broadcasting channel was 
obtained by PKK efforts and that the Kurdish community can also ask for an independent 
state. MY, on the other hand, argued that this is a hollow issue, and that it has been exploited 
by the media. She elaborated that:  
 
“The real issue is that people don‟t question why we focus on Kurdish so much, and 
why it is depicted as Kurdish nationalism. Maybe they sincerely want education but 
there is the unresolved PKK issue. Perhaps, we should look at this issue with reference 
to history education (WP7/13).”  
 
Securitization of ethno-cultural and political claims of the Kurds in Turkey has always been 
the issue ever since the late 19
th
 century; and it has become even more so after the 1980 
military coup (Romano, 2006). Nevertheless, AA, who has openly identified himself as being 
Kurdish, noted that being a Kurd is not necessarily difficult for those living in Eastern and 
South-Eastern Turkey. He noted that his opinions on education in Kurdish are correlated to 
his experiences in Istanbul. He argued that:  
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“When I came to Istanbul for high school, there were tall buildings, it was of a 
different kind from what we called modern back home. My surrounding was different. 
It was a clash of cultures. I was subjected to government brutality at a young age but it 
wasn‟t when I was in my home town. In Istanbul if you are dark skinned then you are 
considered a potential criminal by the police. Such discriminations are made then 
people are called terrorists and separatists. They tried to make us live their way of life, 
it was imposed upon us. This is why we have this problem now (WP7/5).” 
 
His argument is also reflective of our argument in our WP6 report regarding the ways in 
which internally displaced persons (IDPs) and migrants from the South Eastern parts of 
Turkey have not been accommodated in the field of education. Corresponding to AA‟s 
(WP7/5) argument, Çelik (2005) argues that Kurds living in Western cities, such as Istanbul 
face social, economic and political difficulties, and she notes that residents of Kurdish ghettos 
are often perceived as potential criminals. Furthermore, Mills argues that: 
 
“In the urban spaces of everyday life, and in cultural representations of the city, 
Istanbul is a boundary space. Its contours and margins are continually retraced through 
negotiation with the paradox-of being distinctively Turkish and yet of Europe, of 
being secular and modern and yet denying those who are not Muslim and Turkish full 
inclusion-that lies at the core of Turkish nationalism (Mills, 2005: 445).” 
 
Mills‟ argument provides insight into AA (WP7/5)‟s argument, and the social dynamics of the 
city. Structural outsiderism is what ethnic Kurds face in the urban space in the sense that they 
constitute a kind of ethno-class, whose members mainly get involved in manual labour 
intensive jobs, and face a kind of institutional discrimination in everyday life. 
 
In terms of the boycotts, which occurred in September 2010, majority of the interlocutors 
stated that they are aware of them, but AÖ (WP7/18) and ÖG (WP7/20) were the only 
interlocutors who directly indicated their opinions. AÖ noted that: 
 
“Education in one‟s mother language is a right guaranteed by democracy.  However, 
the boycotts, which restrict students in primary schools from going to school, are 
wrong. These boycotts are a form of child abuse for political purposes (WP7/18).”  
 
ÖG, on the other hand, noted that although he was not very informed about the boycotts, he 
believes that all non-violent protests should be supported (WP7/20). The low number of 
students expressing their opinion about the student protests indicates that the Higher 
Education Council‟s regulations have indeed worked out in the sense that it has produced an 
apolitical university environment in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup. 
 
Furthermore, interestingly, AK (WP7/3), EI (WP7/15), AB (WP7/10), and MY (WP7/13) 
referenced the way in which English has come to complement Turkish at the secondary and 
higher education levels. AK (WP7/3) argued that “education in Turkey is hardly in Turkish, 
we learn everything in English.” BB (WP7/8) criticized the use of English in higher education 
and noted that “Why is everything in English? And we are not talking about England; we are 
talking about the USA.” ÇH (WP7/12), who argued that the official language of education in 
Turkey can only be Turkish, also referenced this matter and noted that the way English is not 
taught properly is a problem for most students and professionals, thereby noting that English 
is a significant part of education in Turkey. UA (WP7/9), for instance, noted that English is an 
important quality for employment and that in engineering; fluency in English is a means to 
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assure employment. She further elaborated that “in order to establish common grounds, 
students should learn Turkish and English.”  
 
In terms of the issue of education in Kurdish we see that the interlocutors are divided, 
nevertheless we cannot establish a common socio-demographic characteristic that is valid in 
these differences of opinion. On this issue, “official language” is a phrase that has been used 
by the majority of the interlocutors, while bilingual education is not referenced (except for 
EA (WP7/19)), which is indicative of the way in which the media has been influential in 
forming the opinions of the interlocutors. As such, as previously indicated, as of November 
2010 most of the media coverage has focused on this issue with reference to Turkish as being 
the “official language” of the Turkish state. However, the interlocutors who referenced the 
“practical” aspect of education in Kurdish, or in minority languages have indicated that they 
are not knowledgeable about the way in which education in Kurdish is to be implemented.  
 
The Bologna Process and skill-based education  
 
The interviews indicated that among all the subject matters that we have chosen, the Bologna 
Process is the least known subject, which correlates with our findings in the WP6 report. In 
that regard, the majority of our interlocutors have asked for a clarification about the Process 
and what it entails. In comparison to other subjects there was not a lot of data collected on this 
issue because the majority of the interlocutors indicated their reluctance to provide 
uninformed answers. Those who knew about the Process indicated that they know of it as a 
standardization process initiated by the EU for the European countries, thereby excluding 
non-European countries. Interestingly, when asked about the Bologna Process, many 
interlocutors straightforwardly referred to the Erasmus student exchange program. Our WP5 
and WP6 reports have indicated in detail that the Process was approached cautiously and thus 
framed as “internationalization” to prevent backlash.   
 
Nevertheless, as we indicated in the WP6 report, Turkey is still in the process of 
implementing and internalizing the structural requirements of the Bologna Process, and in that 
sense the media attention directed to this issue has been very limited. BK (WP7/16), who 
professionally has an invested interest in higher education, similarly noted that the Process 
has not taken root in Turkey, and that most individuals are not aware of it. Consequently, 
when interlocutors were informed about the Process, most of them exhibited signs of 
discomfort and unwillingness to comment on this subject particularly with regards to the 
existence or lack of discussion on this matter in European countries.
4
 
 
The lack of information on the Bologna Process contributes to the way in which the 
interlocutors were unable to comment on the correlation between the Process and the notions 
of modernity and modernization. However, after describing the Process with particular 
emphasis on much criticized skill-based orientation vis-a-vis the market-orientation of the 
Process, it is possible to argue that those who have an educational or professional background 
in engineering (forestry, metallurgy, agriculture and the like) have analyzed skill-based 
education as a positive feature. UA (WP7/9) argued that she perceived the Process and 
market-orientation to be positive and argued that in general the high level of unemployment in 
certain sectors is due to the graduates‟ lack of skills. She further noted that: “theory and 
practice has to go hand in hand” to improve the graduates‟ skills thereby increasing their 
employment levels. Similarly, HFÇ argued that:  
                                                          
4
 We should also note that while explaining the Bologna Process, it was necessary to reference the EU and 
European countries thereby nullifying the last two questions of the questionnaire.  
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“It is like occupational high schools that serve their chosen industries. For example, I 
study at the Metallurgy and Product Engineering department, and it would be to my 
advantage to have a specific expertise under this department, so I do not have to 
compete with all the graduates of the department (WP7/4).”   
 
BY correspondingly argued that: “It [skill based education] might be a positive thing since it 
aims to educate more qualified individuals (WP7/11).” On the other hand, some other 
interlocutors took a critical position vis-a-vis the skill-based characteristics of the Bologna 
Process. BB framed this Process within the realm of capitalist motivations and the interests of 
companies, and stated that: 
 
“I think this is about capitalism; they want a productive individual rather than a 
thinking one. It is about profits. For example with ABET
5
, the courses are emptied 
out. A worker on a ship knows more than I do. Our system is based on memorization, 
we don‟t get to practice. I am an engineer but I have no practice (WP7/8).”  
 
There were also arguments, which criticized the ways in which this Process might hinder 
individuals‟ outlooks on the world. These individuals were mainly in the 40-65 age brackets 
and with background in social studies. MY stated that:  
 
“...I think an engineer with no understanding of the world is not a good engineer. Skill 
based education is acceptable for vocational schools, but a person should be equipped 
to face the world when they grade from a University (WP7/13).” 
 
To that effect, SÖ who indicated that culture is indeed a must for all individuals, referred to 
the lack of skills in Turkish higher education system, and argued that:  
 
“I think this is a luxurious question for Turkey. There is a deficiency in terms of skill-
based education in Turkey. I highly value skills.... I think providing a student with 
skills is very positive, skills mean being useful, being productive (WP7/14).”  
 
As previously noted, disciplinary backgrounds of interlocutors are influential factors in 
determining their perception of and attitude towards the Bologna Process and its emphasis on 
skills. In that framework, the purpose of higher education is perceived either as the 
establishment of an efficient labour force, and for the interlocutors competition, or cultivate 
the critical faculties of individuals.   
 
While we specifically focused on the Bologna Process as a Process initiated by the EU, there 
have been some concerns indicated directly BB (WP7/8) and CY (WP7/7) throughout the 
interviews about the capitalist motivations and a general distrust in the USA. Most 
significantly, they also defined the standardization of education as a process stimulated by the 
USA. BB argued that the EU, is in and of itself,  
 
“a product of capitalism; they do not want minorities to be happy either. European 
countries do not act independently from the USA; I think the EU is also a USA guided 
                                                          
5
Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET) provides institutional accreditation and 
specialized accreditation for specific programs based on the quality standards established by professionals. There 
are various ABET accredited programs in Turkey.   
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project (WP7/8).” 
 
While we were looking to find alternative discourses on modernity or modernization in the 
field of education in the framework of the Bologna Process, one interlocutor, MY directly 
stated that:  
 
“We always look to foreign countries for solutions, in education and in other fields. If the 
Universities are autonomous and the Rectors are chosen by faculty rather than being 
appointed, a solution to these problems can be found. If we implement these, then a 
solution with Europe or with the USA can be attained (WP7/13).” 
 
Accordingly, as it was indicated in the WP6 reports, autonomy of higher education 
institutions is a serious concern in terms of education and the establishment of quality 
education, while the American model of education still constitutes to be the preferable model 
for some interlocutors. As Erçetin indicates “private universities [in Turkey] can enjoy 
administrative and financial autonomy, while state universities cannot (2005: 25)”, which is 
also addressed in terms of the Bologna Process reforms. In that framework, and in line with 
the observations of the interlocutors, it is possible to argue that individuals are supportive of 
financially and administratively autonomous higher education institutions, which are not 
under the authority of the central system.  
 
On account of our interviews, it is visible that there are various approaches to the 
standardization of education within the framework of the Bologna Process. Interlocutors have 
indicated that they have a general distrust in the higher education system with particular 
references to the quality of education. The interviews conducted for the WP6 report led to 
similar findings. Furthermore, we should also draw attention to the fact that some of the 
interlocutors acknowledged the need for higher standardization on the basis of globalization. 
Nevertheless, VA indicated: “When there are so many sources there is a problem with quality 
and standardization (WP7/17).” In that regard his argument was based on the proliferation of 
educational systems in accordance with communications technologies, such as online 
education. He further argued that “in the light of the advances in information technology such 
as online education, there is a need for universal standards (WP7/17)”. 
 
The interlocutors indicated that they have a general distrust in the current higher education 
system vis-a-vis the YÖK‟s (Higher Education Council) top-down approach and the 
reformation process. BK (WP7/16) argued that the system is “overwhelmed with reforms” 
and the “rationale” of the Bologna Process has been omitted in relaying the necessary 
reforms. Nevertheless, in terms of the higher education system our findings have not yielded 
sufficient information to generalize private individuals‟ perceptions towards the notions of 
modernization in terms of the Bologna Process. 
 
As previously indicated, there is a general lack of knowledge, save the Erasmus program 
which in and of itself is problematically known as an exchange program without any 
references to Europeanization or the Bologna Process, it is possible to observe that while 
domestic issue such as the headscarf ban, history education and bilingual education are very 
well known, this Process has been left out of the political and social agenda. The reference to 
the USA, on the other hand, are a reflection of what we have argued in our WP6 and WP7 
reports which is that the Turkish higher education system was built upon the American Model 
via American founded Universities in the 1950s. In that sense, we can state that the USA 
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positively or negatively still constitutes to be the basis of individuals‟ understanding of 
Turkish higher education system.    
 
History education in Turkish high schools: Portrayal of Neighbouring and European 
Countries  
 
As it was the case in the WP6 report, this subject matter was in fact the most criticized issue 
throughout our interviews. In correlation with our findings in the WP6 report, all interlocutors 
indicated discomfort with the ways in which history education portrays neighbouring 
countries as well as the European countries. VA, on the other hand, was the only interlocutor 
who was rather more optimistic and indicated that:  
 
“We see that Turkey is coming to terms with her past. History is being rediscovered 
and transformed from one-sided history into a more pluralist one. These [national 
history] are parts of the puzzle of the World history (WP7/17).”  
 
His argument was noticeably different from other interlocutors in that he perceived history 
within the realm of technological advances and the proliferation of available resources. It is 
possible to infer that his perception was based on a confidence in the role of individuals who 
can approach information critically. While majority of the interlocutors indicated that human 
agency is an important element of critical thinking, ÖG noted that in most cases individuals 
(students) tend to think that “if it is in the textbook, than it must be true (WP7/20).” 
 
Although the interlocutors maintained their dissatisfaction with the current textbooks, 
majority of the interlocutors stated that they find the system justifiable on the grounds that this 
is a common means of nation-state building in European countries. In that sense, the majority 
of the interlocutors indicated that the history curriculum has been conceived to unify the 
Turkish state, and create a national consciousness in order to establish a unitary state.  Our 
WP5 and WP6 reports maintained that nationalist discourse is a significant part of the 
education system, and particularly history education; and in this case the reference to 
European countries is a means to justify this discourse with Western references. Nevertheless, 
it is important to note that the interlocutors did not tend to question this phenomenon which is 
a reflection of the success of the curriculum in maintaining the nationalist discourse.  
 
Some interlocutors made references to the Ottoman Empire and preferred to discuss history 
education with regards to the ways in which the Ottoman Empire is glorified in history 
textbooks. For instance, CY argued that he does not like the “infatuation” with the Ottoman 
Empire and the predacious government image and stated that:  
 
“I think this [focus on the Ottoman history] is the foundation of nationalism. I think it 
also shows some admiration for the Ottoman Empire. As the Empire was very strong 
at that time, there is also a yearning for that kind of power. It also relates to the fact 
that there is a militaristic tradition in Turkey. I think the way history is taught aims to 
prohibit reasonable thinking (WP7/7).” 
  
Similarly, AK noted that: 
 
“I think the reason that European countries have such a negative image is due to our 
feeling of inferiority to the West. There isn‟t any national identity until the Ottoman 
Empire. So history education focuses on the Ottoman identity first, then religious 
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identity and then Turkishness (WP7/3).”  
 
In parallel to AK (WP7/3), MY also argued that: 
 
“There is an inferiority complex with regards to the Ottoman Empire, the books state 
that Arabs stabbed us in the back, and that Europe is an enemy. History education 
emphasizes that we were deceived by the neighbours and the Europeans. I have not 
read anything objective really (WP7/13).” 
 
Drawing upon our WP6 report and the work of Çayır and Gürkaynak (2008), we should note 
that Turkish history education was criticized for not focusing on recent history while there 
were also concerns that history textbooks identified internal and external enemies to maintain 
the unity of Turkish citizens. As AK (WP7/3) noted, the “feeling of inferiority to the West” is 
a common theme in academic works. To that effect, Metin Heper notes that this feeling of 
“inferiority” is indeed a reaction to Europe, and argues that:  
 
“The rationale behind their [the Turks who used the word “Turk” in its ethnic sense] 
acting in this manner was to regain their self-confidence and do away with the 
inferiority complex that they had begun developing as a consequence of having 
continuously lost against their European adversaries from the late sixteenth century 
onward.” (Heper, 2004: 16) 
 
In terms of modernity, as AK noted the extensive focus on the Ottoman Empire is perhaps a 
claim to modernity vis-a-vis Empire‟s contributions to the West. However, her observations 
also follow that history education and the way in which Turkey is portrayed as “alone”, “in 
danger” is confusing for young individuals. Subsequently, she notes that: 
  
“you are taught that you are neither western nor eastern. You learn that everyone is 
against you. For example, we want to become a member of the EU, but we also talk 
about Muslim brotherhood (İslam Kardeşliği) (WP7/3).”  
 
Furthermore, while the Ottoman history has been a key word in the majority of our 
interviews, Kemal Ataturk has also been mentioned various times. As our WP5 and WP6 
reports indicated, the National Assembly accepted the in accordance with the Basic Law on 
National Education No. 1739 dated 14 June 1973, Turkish education system, primary, 
secondary and higher education, is founded on Ataturk‟s principles. PB (WP7/2) mentioned 
that history courses were also carried out in reference to Ataturk and his principles while she 
also noted that her history teachers‟ personal views on Ataturk were also a factor in the way 
they framed neighbouring and European countries.  
 
To that effect, MY (WP7/13) also argued that “Ataturk is idealized, portrayed as untouchable 
and there are no criticisms. The outlook seems like worshipping Ataturk, as a deity. But we do 
not protect the system. It is based on memorizing, and it is hollow.” Furthermore, BK 
(WP7/16) indicated the confusion that the overabundance of themes on Ataturk, in primary 
education. Furthermore, she elaborated that geography education is also problematic, which 
focuses on Turkey and omitting other countries and continents. In that regard, geography 
education has also been problematic in Turkish education, because it focuses on Turkey and 
to some extent surrounding countries, which in combination with history education does not 
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yield sufficient knowledge of world history and geography.
6
  
 
In order to maintain unity, glorifying the Ottoman history and later early Republican history 
vis-à-vis the identification of enemies is also perceived as the fundamental means to introduce 
Turkish nationalism via history education (SÖ (WP7/14), MY (WP7/13)). However, as 
previously mentioned, some interlocutors also find this justifiable; as such AA stated that:  
 
“The images portray Turkey positively. In social sciences books, Turkish nationalism 
is imposed on students. It is mostly based on memorization. The portrayals are 
defensive. It states that “they” [foreign countries] attacked us. The portrayals of events 
are not objective... I don‟t think this [negative discourses on foreign states] is not 
exclusive to Turkey, all states do this. This is about governmentality (WP7/5).”  
 
In terms of similar cases in other European countries, it is possible to note that while majority 
of the interlocutors indicated that they are not informed about the system in other European 
countries, they find it likely. For instance, UA mentioned that based on her observations from 
a common project with Greece: “There were similar problems in Greece and the contributions 
of the Ottoman Empire to Europe are often omitted (WP7/9).” Furthermore, SÖ noted that 
“Greek history textbooks have similar prejudices about Turks and there are visuals against the 
Ottoman Empire (WP7/14).” In parallel, CY noted that “I don‟t know if similar issues occur 
in Europe but it probably happens in Germany. I think this is partially about the EU 
(WP7/7).” ÇH indicated that: “Of course there are similar debates, maybe even more than our 
case. The social make-up is more cosmopolitan, more mixed (WP7/12).”  
 
A common solution is very much supported based on the establishment of objective history 
telling in general. ÇH for instance, argued that “Europe fought for centuries, but they forgot 
about those wars and established friendly relations. Maybe this was the aim of the EU 
(WP7/12).” Thereby, his perception of the EU as a peace project was visible. Similarly, BY 
argued: “We absolutely can and should find a common solution [with other European 
countries]. I think EU membership can help us in this issue and we need EU membership to 
see a positive influence on history education (WP7/11).”  
 
In terms of a possible solution to the negative imagery, BY (WP7/11) stated that inquisitive 
history education can be a valid solution. SÖ further argued that a common solution can be in 
the form of establishing certain common principles and noted that: “If history education was 
based on certain principles, then humanism wouldn‟t be just an expression. History is not a 
science but it can be more objective (WP7/14).” HFÇ also noted that “perhaps history 
education in Europe encourages inquiry-based learning... We need to learn the consciousness 
to interpret history (WP7/4).”  
 
This is the only issue where various interlocutors made a direct reference to the EU and its 
consolidative element. EA (WP7/19) also argued that the countries which have this type of 
history telling are in fact counties that have been harmed by the WWII. In light of such views, 
we see that in the case of history telling vis-a-vis history education, interlocutors feel that the 
EU is a unifying entity.  
 
In light of the interviews, history education and the way in which neighbouring and European 
countries have been portrayed is the only issue where we see that majority of interlocutors 
                                                          
6
 For an extensive discussion on the role of geography in the construction of the nation see Anderson (1983) and 
Hooson (1994).   
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perceive as a fundamental problem in the Turkish education system. Interlocutors have been 
very critical about this issue but as previously argued these criticisms are often met with the 
belief that negative discourses are a common means to maintain unity. Majority of the 
interlocutors indicate that although they do not have direct information/knowledge on history 
education in European states, they feel comfortable arguing that it is a common problem. 
Nonetheless, it is possible to observe that the lack of critical thinking, inquisitiveness, and the 
way in which individuals are expected to memorize historical events constitutes an even more 
problematic issue. Interlocutors indicate that, again we should note that majority does not 
have direct knowledge about history education in European countries; the system in Europe is 
likely to support inquisitiveness, and causality thereby placing historical events in a rather 
more realistic structure. Therefore, we can argue that interlocutors are critical of the static 
understanding of history education in Turkey while their perception of history education in 
Europe is seemingly more dynamic.   
 
The Headscarf Debate and subsequent student protests 
 
Headscarf issue has been one of those issues, which have always attracted a great popular 
attention in Turkey, as it has become a symbolic fault line epitomizing the ongoing debate 
between seculars and Muslims, modernists and traditionalists, and Europeans and 
Eurosceptics etc. (Göle, 2003; Toprak and Çarkoğlu, 2006; Saktanber, 2002). As it was the 
case in boycotts in the case of Kurdish language education, while the questions were 
formulated in the framework of student protests, there have been only two interlocutors who 
directly referenced these protests. To that effect, EI argued that:  
 
“They [students wearing the headscarf] already enter Universities, and I support that they 
should. I don‟t have extensive information about the student protests but I suppose they 
were successful since students wearing the headscarf enter Universities (WP7/15).” 
 
NK (WP7/1) also argued that she learned about the conflictual nature of this issue three years 
ago via the rise of student protests which she attributes to the increasing awareness of students 
as well as to the increasing demand for religious representation. She appreciates the student 
demonstrations, and she perceived them as a sign of political participation, which corresponds 
to the views of Nilüfer Göle who has written on the role of women‟s willingness to wear the 
headscarf and on their role in modernity (Göle, 2002; and 2003). In line with Göle‟s 
argument, NK (WP7/1) contended that there are certain behavioural expectations from the 
public and certain behaviours are repressed for the sake of standardization (tek tipleştirme), a 
notion which she underlined various times. She noted that these expectations are not confined 
to the headscarf issue, and that there are rules for everything in Turkey. In light of the lack of 
references to student protests, although it was provided in the question, we can infer that these 
protests were overshadowed by the debates on the legal aspects of this issue.  
 
Fuat Keyman argues that Turkish modernity has been transformed as Islamic identity claims 
became more (1) politicized, (2) economically grounded, and (3) culturally loaded recognition 
demands such as the headscarf debate (Keyman, 2007: 216). He further argues that:  
 
“Islamic identity claims and their plural and multi-dimensional nature do not 
constitute an anti-modern discourse about religious self, but rather a politics of identity 
operating within modernity and demanding recognition. Today, it is not possible to 
think of Turkish modernity without reference to Islam. Nor is it possible to think of 
Turkish secularism as uncontested. In fact, the changing nature of Turkish modernity 
 16 
 
has been marked, to a large extent, by the crisis of Turkish secularism (Keyman, 
2007:217).” 
  
In that regard, it is possible to observe that while the headscarf debate as a symbol of the 
religious-secular divide is highly politicized thereby leading to differences of opinion, 
academic works indicate that Islamic identity claims such as the headscarf are indeed 
reflections of modernity, the need for recognition vis-a-vis the contestation of the status-quo.  
 
Furthermore, In terms of similar debates in other European countries, we observe that the 
debates in France and in some cases the decision of the ECHR in Leyla Sahin v. Turkey case 
is given as an example. Nonetheless, in this case it is possible to observe that there has been 
an emphasis on the French case in the Turkish media as it was correlated with the political 
debates in Turkey (see interalia, Sabah Daily, http://www.sabah.com.tr/, 24.11.2010). The 
role of the media is apparent in terms of this subject matter, since all interlocutors noted that 
they have heard and followed this debate from the media. The headscarf issue is a significant 
reflection of the media‟s central role in forming and shaping public opinion.  
 
As noted by NK (WP7/1) that there has been a recent attempt to standardize the Turkish 
community, which has resulted in the polarization of the Turkish society. AB similarly argued 
that:  
 
“the real issue is about polarization in society due to the fundamentalist ideas via-a-vis 
Islam and secularism. This polarization has led the people to identify themselves in 
terms of political parties (WP7/10).”   
 
Nevertheless, some interlocutors argued that the debate surrounding the headscarf should be 
discussed within the realms of the Turkish Constitution. For instance, ÇH (WP7/12) indicated 
that the Turkish dress code has been written into the Constitution, thus this issue can only be 
debated with reference to the Constitution and noted that the politicization of the headscarf 
debate is an unsettling matter. Concurrently, HFÇ (WP7/4), AK (WP7/3), MY (WP7/13), AA 
(WP7/5), BY (WP7/11), BK (WP7/16) identified that this issue is in fact politicized by certain 
groups to promote and pursue political interest. EA, on the other hand, attributed this debate 
to economics, and argued that “the fundamental issue is the economic deficit (WP7/19).” 
Nevertheless, the majority of the interlocutors consented that the headscarf debate is a key 
factor in the religious-secular divide.  
 
When the interlocutors were requested to opine on the debates in European countries, some 
interlocutors noted the religious demographics of Turkey and argued that debates in Europe 
are not as intense as they are in Turkey because they experience Islam as a minority religion 
while the Turkish society is predominantly Muslim. This argument often constituted the 
foundations for the interlocutors‟ arguments of the possibility of a common solution. To that 
effect, AK noted that: 
 
“Since our Constitution is inspired from Europe, we are a laicist country but the 
composition of the society is considerably different from European societies. The 
country is predominantly Muslim, and a considerable portion of the society wears the 
headscarf. In comparison to Europe, perhaps France, Muslims are a minority and this 
issue is not so important since they are not as visible as they are in Turkey (WP7/3).” 
 
Similarly, EI (WP7/15) noted that a common solution with the European countries on this 
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issue cannot be found since “the experiences are different, the real issue is about Islam and 
there are different perceptions of Islam.” AÖ, on the other hand argued that: 
 
“there shouldn‟t be any religious symbol in education however, if a student wearing 
the headscarf cannot enter University premises then a student wearing the crucifix 
should not be allowed either... This creates a predicament (WP7/18).”  
 
AÖ‟s (WP7/18) argument was indeed based on the perception that the headscarf is being 
singled out as a religious symbol. ÖG (WP7/20) similarly argued that he doesn‟t think the 
headscarf would constitute a handicap at Universities and that in thinking about this issue the 
kippah and the crucifix should also be taken into consideration. Furthermore, the interlocutors 
have also maintained their discomfort with regards to the rise of Islamophobia in Europe. For 
example, AB argued that: 
  
“As Islam became a threat in Europe, similar debates have been initiated. There are 
students with the headscarf at my University in Germany and they are welcome. However, 
there are people who see this as a threat as well. These people criticize the women 
wearing the headscarf for being backwards, and unable to go along with modernity and 
German culture. It is very saddening to see these arguments at the university level 
(WP7/10).”   
 
While AB (WP7/10) drew upon his experiences and observations in his country of residence 
(Germany), when asked if there are similar debates in other European countries, MY 
(WP7/13) also argued that the debates have not been carried out in the framework of religious 
symbols but exclusively in terms of the headscarf. Nevertheless, we should note that several 
interlocutors have expressed that the way in which the headscarf is being considered as a 
symbol for Islam in Turkey and in European countries is a source of concern for some of the 
interlocutors. Their concern stems from the way in which the headscarf has been utilized as a 
symbol of religious belief while religious symbols such as the kippah and the crucifix were 
excluded from this debate. As it was the case in terms of education in Kurdish, interlocutors 
indicated that religious symbols should not be debated exclusively in terms of the headscarf. 
As our WP6 report discussed this issue is highly controversial in terms of the religious-secular 
divide and our interviews indicate that the interlocutors are not fond of the politicization of 
this issue and the use of the headscarf as a symbol in Turkey. We should also note that some 
interlocutors also discussed this issue with reference to Islamophobia in Europe, which 
accounts for their concerns towards the debates in European countries. Significantly, ÖG 
(WP7/20) further argued that “Islamophobia exists in Turkey as well” which he later  
Furthermore, we also observed that a few interlocutors perceive way in which the headscarf 
has become synonymous with Islam as a means of standardization without any 
acknowledgement of the heterogeneity of the women wearing the headscarf.   
 
One particular interlocutor stated that his views on the headscarf contradicts with his 
understanding of modernity, BB stated that:  
 
“the headscarf is unnecessary. There are more important issues. It is visual pollution; it 
is not very nice to see women with the chador. It is not modern. I think is backward. 
This issue is being politically manipulated (WP7/8).”  
 
In correlation with the identification of the headscarf with backwardness, some female 
interlocutors (AK (WP7/3), SÖ (WP7/14), UA (WP7/9)) also indicated that the way in which 
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this debate has been reduced to women constitutes a problem since men who have similar 
Islamic beliefs and in some cases more “dangerous” (as stated by UA (WP7/9)) beliefs are 
undetected. In that regard, SÖ contributed this occurrence to the patriachal structure of the 
society and argued that “All men, whether they support the left-right wing come together 
under this structure (WP7/14).” 
 
Furthermore, majority of the interlocutors indicated that the headscarf ban should be lifted on 
the basis of human rights and women‟s right to education. Nonetheless, most interlocutors 
who support lifting the headscarf ban question the motives behind the headscarf. To that 
effect, there is a general consensus that if women wear the headscarf on their own volition 
then they should be able to do so. Nonetheless, the interlocutors note that community and 
family pressures still exist in this issue therefore the motives behind the headscarf are 
impossible to distinguish. 
 
While most interlocutors have criticized the way in which the headscarf ban has become very 
politicized and consequently contributed to the polarization of the society, it is possible to 
observe that in terms of the existence of similar debates in Europe, France is the most well-
known case, and the UK is the second most referenced case. Nevertheless, throughout the 
interviews we observed that the majority of the interlocutors have been hesitant in referring to 
other European countries. In reference to the alternative discourses that are present in 
European countries, we observe that the interlocutors have attributed the different nature of 
these debates to the perceptions, experiences and the number of Muslim minorities in 
European countries.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks  
 
The findings from our field research indicate that the interlocutors are very critical of the 
ways in which the issues discussed in this report are approached by the Turkish state and the 
media. The most important finding of our research is that the interlocutors‟ opinions indicate a 
general preference to “modernize” the educational system. The interlocutors and the 
framework in which they preferred to discuss the identified subject matters are indeed 
reflective of a general criticism of the status quo. It is possible to observe that there is a 
general criticism towards the past and current governments for politicization of the selected 
issues in the field of education. Nonetheless, since these issues were reflections of general 
contestations in the Turkish politics and society, the interlocutors often referenced the 
implications of these issues in matter beyond the field of education. In doing so, their 
responses were critical of both the current government and the opposition and in some cases it 
transcended into a criticism of the Turkish mindset and public opinion. Critical attitudes of the 
interlocutors as well as their reflexivity on the issues presented to them are in line with the 
definition/understanding of modernity as a belief in human agency, self-reflexivity and 
critical attitude. Humanism is another important feature of the individuals‟ understanding of 
modernity in the sense that the interlocutors express their conviction in human agency.  
 
It is possible to observe that modern education and/or modernization of education is often 
discussed with references to the USA by the interlocutors between the 20-45 age bracket. As 
previously indicated these references appear to be both positive and negative. Nonetheless, 
concurrent with our WP5 and WP6 reports, the American model introduces in the 1950s still 
constitutes an important element if individuals‟ opinions towards the higher education system 
in Turkey. In line with our previous reports, we can also argue that the way in which the 
Bologna Process as the most comprehensive and recent attempt to Europeanize the system is 
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framed as “internationalization” contributes to the lack of information on the influence of 
Europe vis-a-vis modernity. In that regard, while our previous reports maintained that 
Westernization and Europeanization can be used interchangeably to refer to the modernization 
of Turkey, we find that “Americanization” as a source of standardization is also an important 
element of the Turkish education system.   
 
In regards to national identity, it is important to note that national identity (Turkishness) is not 
essentialized by the interlocutors. Furthermore, while interlocutors did not reference Turkish 
nationalism, we observe that they maintain their anxiety about minority nationalism, 
particularly Kurdish nationalism, which is perceived as a threat to the unity of the state. 
Additionally, the interlocutors support religious and ethnic diversity so long as diversity does 
not lead to claims that would constitute as separatism and a threat for the Turkish state. It is 
important to note that the interviews indicate that interlocutors in general perceive nationalism 
as a strategy and a tactic which aims to maintain the unitary state. In light of this information, 
we observe that while the interlocutors perceive nationalism as a tactic to maintain the unitary 
state and approach it critically to embrace diversity, diversity in and of itself is accepted as 
long as it doesn‟t threaten the unity of the Turkish state. 
 
While there was a certain level of consensus with regards to the interlocutors‟ perceptions on 
modernity and national identity, perceptions towards Europe and Europeanization are more 
diverse. In some cases modernity is directly referenced by the interlocutors but it is possible 
to say that the EU does not represent modernity for the majority of individuals while Europe 
as a synonym for West does. Furthermore, the interlocutors often evaded questions about the 
EU, and preferred to frame their answers as Europe. This can be attributed to the fact that the 
media attention to the EU has been in the decline since 2005, and as it was the case in the 
Bologna Process, the EU is perceived to be problematic due to its top-down approach in the 
reformation process. In that regard, the EU as an entity and the EU harmonization efforts have 
not been internalized in Turkey, while Europe and Europeanness as a cultural phenomenon is 
indeed relevant for the individuals. Throughout the interviews, the interlocutors discussed 
Europe as modernity, a synonym for the West, the sourse of reason, a meta-identity, a 
transformatory power, a union based on diversity and freedom, a challenge, an economic and 
cultural power, and the other.
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